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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Ernest John Young, aka Jason Pressley, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from the denial of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to 
influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a judge. This Court has jurisdiction 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue. Did the trial court properly deny the motion to withdraw Defendant's 
guilty plea? 
Standard of Review. A denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion; underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. 
State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, f 7,140 P3d 1288. This Court need not reach the 
merits, however, because Defendant fails to comply with the marshaling and 
briefing requirements set forth in rule 24, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by the constitutional 
standard embodied in UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008): 
A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of 
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily 
made. 
Appellate marshaling and briefing requirements are contained in rule 24(a)(9). See 
Addendum A (Statutes & Rules). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In May 2006, Defendant was charged with two counts of influencing, 
impeding, or retaliating against a judge, third degree felonies, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-8-316(1) (West 2004) (R. 4-2). Because the threats were made 
against Third Judicial District Court judges, the case was transferred to the Fourth 
Judicial District (R. 8). The Utah County Legal Defender Association [LDA] was 
appointed to represent Defendant (R. 12-11). 
Though LDA was appointed, Defendant filed various pro se requests and 
motions, expressing his belief that he was Elvis Presley's biological son and that the 
Presley family had conspired against him to deprive him of custody of his children 
and a $750,000.00 settlement (R. 45-35 & 51). In July 2006, the trial court appointed 
two alienists to examine Defendant to determine his competency to stand trial (R. 
2 
61-56). After examining Defendant, the alienists, Drs. Richard R. Wootton and Eric 
Nielsen, reported that he was not competent (R. 170 & R. 171).1 
In a subsequent evidentiary hearing, the doctors testified that Defendant 
suffered from a delusional disorder, either of a grandiose or persecutory type, or 
possibly paranoid schizophrenia (R407: 5-6 & 15). See also R170: 4; R171: 1. Dr. 
Wootton characterized Defendant as intelligent, with a good vocabulary and a 10th 
grade or higher reading ability (R407:8). See also R170:2. Both doctors concluded 
that Defendant had a factual understanding of the charges and the court process, 
including an understanding of what he was accused of doing, the potential penalties 
he faced, the possibility of consecutive sentences, and the adversary nature of the 
proceedings (R407:9-12 & 17). See also R170:3; R171:2. According to the doctors, he 
understood that if he pled guilty, he would be acknowledging responsibility for his 
criminal conduct and waiving trial (R171:7). Defendant could distinguish between 
1
 These two competency reports, plus two subsequent reports, are under seal. 
See R. 170,171,246 & 337. Consequently, the State refers to their contents only in 
general terms and as necessary to respond to Defendant's allegations. Drs. Wootton 
and Nielsen additionally testified and the court entered findings regarding 
Defendant's mental status (R. 191-85 & 344-38; R. 407). The testimony and findings 
are not under seal. 
3 
the implications of a guilty plea and a plea of no contest (id.).2 Nevertheless, 
Defendant's delusional beliefs prevented him from rationally conferring with LDA 
or engaging in strategic decisions (R407: 6-7 & 17-21). See also R170:5-6; R171:2 & 
7). In October 2006, the court found that Defendant was incompetent and 
transferred him to the state hospital for treatment (R407:26-27; R. 191-83). 
Defendant's status was reviewed in March 2007 (R. 229 & 243). The hospital 
doctors, Drs. Richard Spencer and Robert Sawicki, opined that while Defendant 
maintained a factual understanding of the case and proceedings, he still lacked a 
rational understanding (R. 246). For example, he could "independently state the 
rights that he would be surrendering if he pled guilty," but his delusional beliefs 
dominated and interfered with a rational discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages of a potential plea bargain (R246:4). The court found that Defendant 
was still incompetent and set a review hearing for May 31,2007 (R. 250). 
By the time of the May hearing, Defendant's competency was restored. Drs. 
Spencer and Sawicki opined that while Defendant retained the belief that he was 
Elvis's son, he could now compartmentalize and control his delusional thinking (R. 
337). As always, Defendant had a factual understanding of the proceedings and 
2
 Defendant was previously convicted of other offenses and apparently pled 
no contest in some cases (R. 171: 7). The presentence report is under seal (R. 403) 
The State refers to its contents only in general terms and as necessary to respond to 
Defendant's allegations. 
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could state the constitutional rights he would waive if he pled guilty (R337:3). But 
he had regained a rational imderstanding and could now discuss the advantages 
and disadvantages of a plea bargain (id.). Moreover, he had gained insight into his 
own conduct. He now recognized that his desire to be acknowledged as Elvis' son 
has "nothing to do with my [criminal] case" (id.). And he could identify factors that 
may have contributed to his criminal conduct, as well as possible mitigating 
circumstances and defenses (id.). 
Defense counsel did not contest the doctors' findings and stipulated that 
Defendant was competent (R410:2). Consequently, the court ruled that Defendant 
was competent to proceed to trial and entered findings concerning his 
understanding of the charges and the criminal process: 
[Finding 2] . . . The defendant can state the pending charges against 
him, and accurately describe! ] the general aiminal justice process he 
now faces including its adversarial nature and the various roles of the 
parties to those court proceedings. 
[Finding 3]... [T]he defendant can now have positive interactions with 
his attorney and can appreciate the benefits of that relationship. The 
defendant can accurately relate factors that go into his criminal case, 
mitigating circumstances and possible defenses and can make reasoned 
choices in accordance with facts he may wish to discuss with his 
counsel[.] 
[Finding 4]... [T]he defendant is able to differentiate potential penalties 
carried by either a felony or misdemeanor conviction [that] could result 
in this case and therefore has the present capacity to comprehend and 
appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties that may be 
imposed in the proceedings against him. . . . [T]he defendant 
5 
understands the penalties that may be imposed in the event he were 
convicted of the offenses charged against him. 
[Finding 5]... [T]he defendant has the present capacity to engage in 
reasoned choice of legal strategies and options and to appreciate the 
consequences of choosing to represent himself or taking the advice of 
counsel. 
[Finding 6] . . . [T]he defendant has the capacity to, and in fact 
understands the adversary nature of the proceedings against him and 
the roles of the attorneys, the judge, and the jury applicable to his 
case[.] 
(R. 341-42). See also Addendum B (Findings Re: Competency Restoration). 
On June 14,2007, two weeks after the court entered these findings, Defendant 
pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement (R. 348-47). Defendant acknowledged the 
terms of the agreement in his written Statement in Support of Guilty Plea: 
I will plead to Count I as charged. The State will dismiss Count 2. The 
State is not opposed to a 402 reduction of Count I to a Class A 
misdemeanor so long as I successfully complete probation. The State 
will recommend that my sentence be served at the mental health court. 
(R. 352). At the same time, Defendant acknowledged in the Statement that the 
potential penalty he faced was a prison sentence of up to five years and a $5,000.00 
fine, which sentence could additionally include an 85% surcharge and a $25.00 
security fee (R. 357). He also acknowledged that the prosecutor's sentencing 
recommendation was not binding on the court (R. 352). See also Addendum C 
(Statement in Support of Guilty Plea). 
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After defense counsel restated the terms of the plea agreement in open court, 
the court inquired into Defendant's understanding of the plea by asking if defense 
coimsel had reviewed the written Statement with Defendant and if counsel believed 
that Defendant understood the constitutional rights delineated in the Statement 
(R404:2-3). Defense counsel replied that Defendant had read the Statement and that 
counsel also had reviewed it with him (R404:3). Based on their discussion, defense 
coimsel opined that Defendant understood the rights he was waiving in pleading 
guilty and the potential penalty he faced (id.). 
The court then asked Defendant if he agreed with his counsel's 
representations; Defendant replied that the statements were correct (id.). The court 
asked Defendant if he understood that by pleading guilty, he was "giv[ing] up" the 
constitutional rights set out in the Statement and that he would have "no further 
opportunity to contest the charges against you" (id.). Defendant affirmed that he 
understood and quipped, "The file's not going to get any bigger, your Honor" (id.). 
The court assured Defendant that it made no difference how large the file got, the 
question was how the criminal case would be settled (id.). Defendant agreed (id.). 
See Add. C (Plea Hearing). 
When the court asked Defendant if he had "any questions or concerns" he 
would like to discuss, Defendant turned to his attorney and asked, "Only - you did 
say transfer to mental health [c]ourt correct" (R404:3-4). After counsel replied in the 
7 
affirmative, Defendant responded, "I understand" (R404:4). The court followed up 
by asking Defendant if he understood that nevertheless a sentence of up to five 
years in prison could be imposed; Defendant said, "Yes" (id.). The court again 
asked if he understood that "there are no guarantees of what the sentence might be, 
except that the maximum sentence can be imposed," and Defendant responded, 
"Yes, sir. I do" (id.). See Add. C. 
Defendant signed the Statement (R404: 5), The court found that Defendant 
had reviewed and understood the Statement, including the potential penalties and 
the court's right to impose a prison sentence (id.). The court further found that 
Defendant was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty (id.). Defendant did 
not dispute these findings. Defendant then pled guilty to Count I; the court found 
the plea knowing and voluntary. Count II was dismissed. (R404: 5-6). 
A month later, LDA withdrew and conflict counsel was appointed; sentencing 
was also continued (R. 363 & 366). In September 2007, conflict counsel filed a 
motion to withdraw Defendant's plea (R. 382-73). The motion alleged three grounds 
for withdrawal: (1) LDA was ineffective for failing to adequately advise Defendant 
of his rights; (2) no one told him that a surcharge and security fee could be imposed; 
and (3) the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11, UTAH RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (id.). The prosecutor opposed the motion because none of the 
allegations established that the plea was not knowing and voluntary (R. 397-90). 
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The court reviewed an audiotape of the plea hearing and found no rule 11 violation 
(R. 402-1). The court concluded that the plea was knowing and voluntary and 
denied tine motion to withdraw (id.). 
The same day, November 1,2007, Defendant was sentenced. Though defense 
counsel and the prosecutor recommended probation, the presentence report 
recommend prison (R. 403: R405:4-10). The court opined that Defendant was not a 
good candidate for probation and sentenced him to zero-to-five years 
imprisonment, granting credit for the pre-plea time Defendant was in jail and the 
state hospital (R. 402-01; R405:10). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Count I. On May 21,2006, Defendant telephoned Judge Timothy Hansen four 
times and, each time, left essentially the same recorded message (R. 3). Defendant 
demanded that the judge pay him $750,000.00 and threatened to "execute [Judge 
Hansen's] mother-f—king ass" if the judge did not comply (id.). 
Count II. On May 5-7,2006, Defendant telephoned Judge Joseph Fratto, Third 
District Court Judge, nine times and, each time, left essentially the same recorded 
message (R. 3-2). Defendant demanded that Judge Fratto return some documents to 
him and threatened to "execute [Judge Fratto's] mother-f—ing ass" if he did not 
comply (R. 3-2). 
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Defendant admitted the calls seemed "bizarre," but initially alleged that they 
were necessary to obtain his "fortune" and the return of his children from Lisa 
Presley (R. 34-32). After he regained his competency, he admitted he was wrong to 
threaten the judges (R. 403). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court may summarily reject Defendant's challenge to the trial court's 
denial of his motion to withdraw because Defendant's brief wholly fails to comply 
with rule 24(a) (9)'s marshaling and briefing requirements. 
Defendant minimally asserts that the trial court and his plea counsel failed to 
inform him of "all his constitutional rights," but does not otherwise identify the 
alleged errors. Nor does he support his general allegation with developed legal 
analysis and argument. Instead, he provides legal quotations and string citations, 
but no application of that law to the facts of this case. He also fails to marshal the 
facts that support the validity of his plea and the denial of his motion to withdraw. 
Defendant's fallure to comply with rule 24 justifies summary affirmance. 
Moreover, as defense counsel candidly admits, this appeal is not as much 
about Defendant's plea, as about his sentence. BrAplt. at 7. He does not allege, 
however, that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to prison or that a 
prison sentence is illegal. Consequently, his complaint does not raise a legal issue. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24 
JUSTIFIES SUMMARY REJECTION OF HIS APPEAL AND 
AFFIRMANCE OF HIS CONVICTION AND SENTENCE. 
In his Summary of Argument and his argument point heading, Defendant 
asserts that his guilty plea is not knowing and voluntary because the court and LDA 
failed to inform him of "all of his constitutional rights/' BrAplt. at 6-7. Defendant 
alleges no specifics, other than to generally claim that this violates rule 11, UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, and renders his counsel ineffective. Id. The 
argument portion of his brief is entirely devoid of legal analysis, containing only 
legal quotations and string citations. See BrAplt. at 7-9. He also fails to marshal the 
facts that support the trial court's ruling. Because Defendant fails to comply with 
the marshaling and briefing requirements of rule 24(a)(9), UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE, this Court may summarily dismiss the appeal. 
Moreover, Defendant's complaint that he is imprisoned does not raise a legal 
issue. And, in any case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the 
legally authorized punishment. 
A. Defendant fails to present developed argument and reasoned 
analysis. 
Rule 24(a)(9) requires that Defendant provide "'a statement of the issues 
presented for review' and an argument containing 'the contentions and reasons... 
with respect to the issues presented... with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
11 
parts of the record relied on/" See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56,17,611 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3 (quoting the rule). Utah's appellate courts have "repeatedly noted" that a brief is 
inadequate and fails to comply with the rule if "it merely contains bald citations to 
authority without development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on 
that authority." Id. at f 9 (internal marks and citation omitted). "An appellate court 
is not a depository in which [Defendant] may dump the burden of argument and 
research. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, Defendant 
"must plead his claims with sufficient specificity for this [C]ourt to make a ruling on 
the merits." Id. This requires Defendant to address the ruling of the trial court and 
explain why that decision should be overturned. See id. at f14 . 
Here, the argument portion of Defendant's brief contains nothing but legal 
quotations and string citations. See BrAplt. at 7-9. There is no mention of the facts, 
the trial court's ruling, or alleged errors. See id. The only place where issues are 
identified is in the Summary of Argument and argument point heading. But even 
then, Defendant's assertions lack specificity. See id. at 6-7. Because Defendant 
wholly fails to meet briefing requirements, his appeal should be summarily rejected. 
See Allen, 2008 XJT 56, <f 18. 
B. Defendant fails to acknowledge controlling legal standards. 
In addition, though Defendant accurately cites Utah cases, he does not 
acknowledge current legal standards governing the withdrawal of guilty pleas. 
12 
For example, Defendant suggests that a violation of rule 11 necessarily 
invalidates a guilty plea. See BrAplt. at 7. That is incorrect. Rule 11(e) directs a plea 
court to find that a defendant understands the constitutional rights listed in the rule 
before a plea is accepted. See Add. A. The rule does not mandate, however, that the 
court itself advise the defendant of those rights. It requires only that the trial court 
find that the defendant has "a conceptual understanding of each of the elements of 
rule 11(e)/' State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f 18,114 P.3d 569. See also State v. Visser, 
2000 UT 88, H 11-13, 22 P.3d 1242. But rule 11 guides only the entry of a guilty 
plea. Section 77-13-6 of the Utah Code governs the plea's withdrawal. 
Prior to 2003, section 77-13-6 permitted a guilty plea to be withdrawn for 
"good cause," which included a failure to strictly comply with rule 11 in the taking 
of the plea. See State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703,704 (Utah App. 1994) (applying the 
pre-2003 version of section 77-13-6 and holding that a failure to strictly comply with 
rule 11 constitutes "good cause" to withdraw a plea). In 2003, the grounds for 
withdrawal were narrowed. Section 77-13-6(2)(a) now permits a guilty plea to be 
withdrawn only upon a "showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." 
See Add. A. This is a constitutional standard. Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 
(Utah 1993) (recognizing that whether a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary is a 
constitutional determination). This constitutional standard, unlike the former "good 
cause" standard, does not require that a guilty plea strictly comply with rule 11(e). 
13 
See Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992 (holding that "a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in 
taking a guilty plea does not" render a plea unknowing or involuntary). 
Nevertheless, when a plea is entered in compliance with rule 11(e), it is presumed to 
be knowing and voluntary. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 22, 26 P.3d 203. 
Defendant does not acknowledge this change in the law nor explain why the trial 
court erred in finding the plea knowing and voluntary. 
Defendant also suggests that the plea colloquy alone determines the validity 
of a guilty plea. See BrAplt. at 8. Again, this is incorrect. Rule 11 recognizes that a 
trial court's finding that a plea is knowing and voluntary "may be based on 
questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting 
these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, 
and acknowledged the contents of the statement" UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(8) 
(emphasis added). Thus, where as here, the trial court determined that Defendant 
read the Statement in Support of Guilty Plea and understood and acknowledged its 
contents, the Statement is properly incorporated into the record and may be relied 
upon to support the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea. State v. Dean, 2004 
UT 63, f f 9-10,95 P.3d 276. Again, Defendant does not acknowledge this authority 
nor explain why the trial court erred in incorporating and relying upon the 
Statement. 
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Additionally, Defendant does not acknowledge that a plea court may rely on 
other parts of the record in finding a plea knowing and voluntary. This includes, 
but is not limited to, the criminal information, exhibits, the presentence report, and a 
defendant's own trial experience up to the point of the plea. Visser, 2000 UT 88,f 
12; State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216,218 (Utah 1991). Likewise, appellate review of a 
trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw may consider the record as a whole, 
including "the facts and circumstances in which the plea was taken." Dean, 2004 UT 
63,112. Here, the validity of Defendant's plea is not solely determined by the 
colloquy, but also by the written Statement, and may include the prior competency 
evaluations, testimony, and findings that addressed Defendant's understanding of 
the consequences of pleading guilty. See Statement of the Case & Add. B. 
Defendant also suggests any ineffectiveness by LDA justifies withdrawal of 
the guilty plea. Br.Aplt. at 8-9. Again, the statement does not fully reflect the legal 
standard governing the withdrawal of a guilty plea. "When challenging a guilty 
plea on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, a [defendant] must 
demonstrate '"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors he... would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."'" Benvenuto v. Utah, 2007 
UT 53,124,165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,525 (Utah 1994) 
(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,59 (1985)) (emphasis added). See also State v. 
Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61,113,167 P.3d 1046; Dean, 2004 UT 63, i 22. Defendant cites 
15 
similar authority, but fails to acknowledge the essential "but for" component 
required to justify withdrawal of a plea. See BrAplt. at 8. 
In sum, in addition to Defendant's failure to present developed argument and 
reasoned analysis, his failure to acknowledge current legal standards justifies 
summary rejection of his appeal. See Allen, 2008 UT 56, \ 18. 
C. Defendant fails to marshal the facts supporting the trial court's 
ruling. 
Defendant's appeal also should be summarily rejected because he fails to meet 
rule 24's marshaling requirement. Rule 24(a)(9) mandates that a "party challenging 
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding." This requires Defendant to gather "every scrap of competent evidence" 
supporting the trial court's findings and ruling and then establish why, despite this 
supporting evidence, the trial court erred. See State v. Chavez-Expinoza, 2008 UT App 
191,^1 7 & 20,186 P.3d 1023. Failure to meet the marshaling requirement permits 
this Court to summarily affirm. Id. 
As previously discussed, the totality of the record may be considered in 
determining the validity of Defendant's plea. This includes the written Statement 
and prior competency evaluations and findings. Yet, Defendant marshals none of 
these facts, other than to admit that these documents exist. See BrAplt. at 2-5. This 
failure alone justifies summary rejection of his appeal. 
16 
D. Defendant fails to challenge his sentence. 
Defense counsel candidly admits in his Summary of Argument that this 
appeal is not as much about his plea ("Defendant demanded counsel file an appeal 
in this case"), as about his sentence ("Defendant is upset that he was sentenced to 
prison rather than put on probation and into mental health court"). BrAplt. at 6 &7. 
Defendant does not allege, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in 
sentencing him to prison or that a prison sentence is illegal. Consequently, his 
complaint raises no legal issue. 
In any case, Defendant was fully informed before he pled that a prison 
sentence was possible, despite the prosecutor's recommendation for probation. See 
Statement of the Case. Based on the presentence report and recommendation, the trial 
court appropriately rejected the parties' recommendation and lawfully imposed a 
prison sentence. And though Defendant correctly asserts that he needs mental 
health treatment, Br.Aplt. at 7, incarceration does not preclude appropriate 




For all these reasons, Defendant's appeal should be summarily rejected and 
his conviction and sentence affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted October / / , 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTINE R SOLUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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§77-13-5. Withdrawal of plea 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a 
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in 
abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be 
announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw 
the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection 
(2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and 
Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Laws 1980, c 15, § 2; Laws 1989, c 65, § 1; Laws 1994, c 16, § 1; Laws 2003, c 290, § 1, efif. May 5, 
2003; Laws 2004, c 90, § 91, eff. May 3,2004; Laws 2008, a 3, § 251, e£L Feb. 7,2008. 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
RULE 24 . BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be 
set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court 
va;p; A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved 
in the trial court 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of 
this rule. 
*(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
/• 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably para-
graphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in 
the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under 
which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons 
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall 
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought 
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is 
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the 
brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is 
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The adden-
dum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief hut not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of 
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the 
appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter 
service; and 
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance 
to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the 
court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include; 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatis-
fied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, 'except to provide material not included in the adden-
dum of the appellant - The appellee may refer to the addendum of the 
appellant - » * 
(c) Reply, brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of th i s^ul^ No' further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of thetappellate court ; J ^ 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured 
person,' "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original recprd as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursu-
ant to Rule 11 (f) or 11 (g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by 
the, transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. 
If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of briefs.. ., ,? 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the* 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant unless the* 
parties otherwise agree or Jthe court otherwise orders. Each party shall be 
entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs 
shall in combination exceed75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the 
issues raised in the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of 
Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
| (g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant 
and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and 
respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant-, which 
shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the 
court for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that 
exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the 
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good 
cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the 
date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before 
the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be 
accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the 
motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of 
additional pages without further order of the court Whether the motion is 
granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall state the reasons for the supplemental 
citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response 
shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; 
November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003; November 1, 2004; April 1, 2006; November 1, 
2006; April 1, 2008.] 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, 
1 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER RE: 
RESTORATION OF COMPETENCY OF 
DEFENDANT 
Case No. 061402072 
Hon. Gary D.Stott 
On June 1, 2007, the Court held a hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-15-6. The 
defendant was personally present and represented by counsel, David Stewart. The State was 
represented by B. Kent Morgan. The Court, having reviewed the letter submitted by the Richard 
B. Spencer, MD, Clinical Director of the Utah State Hospital and the report of Robert F. 
Sawicki, PhD, Neuropsychologist of the Utah State Hospital regarding the defendant's current 
mental status and any progress made toward competency restoration, and having heard from 
counsel for the defendant and for the State, now enters the following Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order(s) concerning the defendant's competency to stand trial: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER RE: RESTORATION 
OF COMPETENCY OF DEFENDANT 
Case No. 061402072 
Page 2 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the defendant is currently suffering from a mental disorder. More 
specifically, the Court is persuaded that the defendant continues to suffer from a mental illness as 
set forth in Doctor Sawicki's report listing the defendant's mental illness as Schizophrenic 
Spectrum Disorder, Paranoid Type. 
2. Notwithstanding the existence of a mental disorder, the Court finds that the 
defendant's mental illness is being managed, and that his day to day functioning has significantly 
improved. Specifically, the defendant is now able to compartmentalize his beliefs to the extent 
that he is capable of rationally participating in the proceedings against him and has further 
demonstrated that he has the present capacity to comprehend and appreciate the charges or 
allegations against him. The defendant can state the pending charges against him, and accurately 
describes the general criminal justice process he now faces including its adversarial nature and 
the various roles of the parties to those court proceedings. The Court finds that the defendant is 
now capable of viewing the charges against him and the procedures that might seek to hold him 
accountable for those offense outside of the context of the beliefs that he previously focused on 
with regard to his parentage and legal avenues available to pursue the remedies he may wish to 
seek outside of the of the criminal justice process he now faces. He therefore, now has a rational 
understanding of the allegations against him in the context of a real world setting. 
3. As to the defendant's present capacity to disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events 
and states of mind, the Court finds that the defendant can now have positive interactions with his 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER RE: RESTORATION 
OF COMPETENCY OF DEFENDANT 
Case No. 061402072 
Page 3 
attorney and can appreciate the benefits of that relationship. The defendant can accurately relate 
factors that go into his criminal case, mitigating circumstances and possible defenses and can 
make reasoned choices in accordance with facts he may wish to discuss with his counsel and stay 
on track with pertinent issues. 
4. The Court finds that the defendant is able to differentiate potential penalties carried by 
either a felony or misdemeanor conviction that could result in this case and therefore has the 
present capacity to comprehend and appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties that 
may be imposed in the proceedings against him. The Court finds that the defendant understands 
the penalties that may be imposed in the event he were convicted of the offenses charged against 
him. I 
5. The Court finds that his improved abilities to stay focused on the pertinent issues of 
the case provide a basis for finding that the defendant has the present capacity to engage in 
reasoned choice of legal strategies and options and to appreciate the consequences of choosing to 
represent himself or taking the advice of counsel. 
6. The Court finds that the defendant has the capacity to, and in fact understands the 
adversary nature of the proceedings against him and the roles of the attorneys, the judge and the 
jury applicable to his case without impediment of his strongly held beliefs about matters that are 
not pertinent to the criminal allegations lodged against him. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER RE: RESTORATION 
OF COMPETENCY OF DEFENDANT 
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7. The Court finds based upon the report referenced above, and the observations of the 
defendant by the Court, the defendant has the present capacity to manifest appropriate courtroom 
behavior for sustained periods of time that would be necessary in a trial. 
8, The Court finds that as a result of the defendant's demonstrated ability to 
compartmentalize his strongly held beliefs, he presently has the capacity to testify relevantly. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER RE: RESTORATION 
OF COMPETENCY OF DEFENDANT 
Case No. 061402072 
Page 5 
9. The Court finds that in spite of suffering from a mental disorder, the present efforts 
demonstrated by the defendant towards his attorney in the proceedings against him establish that 
the defendant can have a quality relationship with his counsel and the defendant can discuss 
relevant matters with his attorney and consider and choose to accept sound advice provided to 
him by his counsel. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes by a preponderance of 
evidence that the defendant is currently competent to stand trial in that, while he is currently 
suffering from a mental disorder, notwithstanding that disorder 
1. He does have a factual understanding of the proceedings against him; 
2. He does have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him; 
3. He does have a factual and rational understanding of the punishment specified for the 
offenses charged; and 
4. He has the ability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings 
against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER RE: RESTORATION 
OF COMPETENCY OF DEFENDANT 
Case No. 061402072 
Page 6 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the stay of the criminal proceedings in 
this matter is hereby lifted, and the defendant is to be returned to the Utah County Jail with bail 
as originally set in the in the amount of $10,000 is to remain; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the pleading styled as a Notice to Submit for a 
Decision referencing a "writ of habeas corpus" among other matters apparently seeking release 
from the Utah State Hospital is now moot, and upon that basis is hereby dismissed. 
A preliminary hearing is presently scheduled for June 14,2007 at 1:30 p.m. 
DATED this / j day of June, 2007. 
Approved as to form: 
BY THE COURT: 
GARYD. ST07T 
~^)kcM— jfpzr 
, Di^tncf Judge 
:
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m THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, 
aka: Jason Presley 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN 
SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA AND 
CERTD7ICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 061402072 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
I, ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of 
and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
I NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory Degree 
Provision 
Influencing, Impeding, or Retaliating F3 




0-5 years in prison $5000 fine 
plus 85% surcharge $25 security 
fee 
1 
• Enhanceable Second Offense. (Only if checked.) 
I know and understand that if I am convicted in the future of this same crime, the second 
<conviction will be a [Class Misdemeanor/ Degree Felony]. The maximum penalty for 
that crime is . 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it 
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading 
.guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
A. ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, on or about May 5, 2006, in Salt Lake County, Utah, did 
threaten to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge with the intent to impede, intimidate, or 
interfere with the judge while engaged in the performance of the judge's official duties or 
with the intent to retaliate against the judge on account of the performance of those 
official duties. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing 
crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that the 
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and 
prove the elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest): 
On May 5, 2006, in Salt Lake City, Utah, Ernest John Young made several phone calls to 
Judge Hansen of the Third District Court, and threatened to execute him if he did not accept Mr. 
Young's Petition to Seek the Death Penalty and Law Suit. 
2 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under 
the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no 
contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might 
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's 
service to me. I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is David A. Stewart. My 
attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty 
(no contest) plea. 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testify against me and b) my 
attorney would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against 
me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State 
3 
would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a 
juiy trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to 
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that 
if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify 
against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty (or 
no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime. 
If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set 
for trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond 
a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each 
juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence 
.and will be admitting that I committed the crime stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the cost of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
4 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no contest) to a 
crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty 
for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. | 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including 
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
I 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the 
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I 
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another 
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or 
no contest) plea now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to 
which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law 
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record 
that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
5 
Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea is the result of a plea bargain between 
myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, 
if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
I will plead to Count 1 as charged. The State will dismiss Count 2. The State is not 
opposed to a 402 reduction of Count 1 to a Class A misdemeanor so long as I successfully 
complete probation. **\l*-** S^fcu^c <-*JUI rcoo **\ Y*I*JL - j * * - ^ *vuj se^-te^te^/K 
t o e &e^^L * f 4 ^ **€****( h ^ t - f ^ Co^r^ Cjf$ 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentence concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding 
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge 
may do are not binding on the judge. 
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
6 
I am ^O years of age. I have attended school through ^ jgm&e. I can read and 
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided 
to me. I was not under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which would impair 
my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, 
medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file 
a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand that 
for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be made 
within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea 
if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge 
to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this JH^day of d*s^ , 2007 
ERNEST JOHN Yj 
DEFENDANT 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, the defendant above, and 
that I know he has read the statement or that I have read it to him; I have discussed it with him 
and believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically 
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime and factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly 
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in 
the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. /aoSl^> 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against ERNEST JOHN 
YOUNG, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis 
of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense is true and correct. No 
improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The 
plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as 
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered 
and that the acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest / 
8 
ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea is freely, knowingly, and 
voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea to the crime 
set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
Of Utah County, State of Utah 
- 2 -
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 I (Electronically recorded on June 14, 2007) 
3 MR. STEWART: It's Mr. Young's intent to waive his 
4 J preliminary hearing today, and then we've reached a resolution 
5 J in this matter. Being a Salt Lake County case, we're going 
6 to request that he be transported up to the Salt Lake County 
7 Jail for process of — well, when I say "we," I mean the 
8 defense side — be transported up to the Salt Lake County 
9 Jail pending sentencing also for screening for mental health 
10 Court, participation up there. 
11 That doesn't have to happen right away. That could 
12 happen after sentencing, as well. I just want to let the Court 
13 know that screening can take place after sentencing, but — 
14 THE COURT: Okay, what's the resolution? 
15 MR. STEWART: He's going to be pleading to Count I, as 
16 charged. The State will move to dismiss Count II. 
17 MR. MORGAN: That's correct, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Hold on a minute, (inaudible). Count I is 
19 the third-degree on influencing, pending, and retaliating; is 
20 that right? 
21 MR. STEWART: Yes. 
22 MR. MORGAN: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: Count II is to be dismissed? 
24 MR. MORGAN: Yes, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Stewart, have you had an opportunity to 
-3-
go through the statements (inaudible) with him? 
MR. STEWART: I have, your Honor, and he's read through 
it. 
THE COURT: Do you think he understands the information 
in that as to his Constitutional Rights that he's giving up, 
1 
and as to the potential sentences involved in this case? 
MR. STEWART: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Mr. Young « 
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: — you've heard your lawyer's statements to 
me. Do you agree with what he's just told me? 
MR. YOUNG: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that if you give up the 
Constitutional Rights that are set forth in that document that 
you've talked with your lawyer about, you do not have any 
further opportunity to contest the charges against you? 
MR. YOUNG: That's correct. The file's not going to 
get any bigger, your Honor. | 
THE COURT: Well, it doesn't matter how big it is. The 
ultimate question is when does it get settled. 
MR. YOUNG: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Do you now have any questions or concerns 
that you feel you need to talk with Mr. Stewart about before I 
ask you for your plea to this charge? 
MR. YOUNG: Only — you did say transfer to mental 
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health Court correct? 
MR. STEWART: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MR. YOUNG: I understand. 
THE COURT: Do you also understand that this is — the 
charge is a third-degree felony — 
MR. YOUNG: Yes. 
THE COURT: — which carries with it a possible 
sentence — a maximum sentence of zero to five years in the 
Utah State Prison? 
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that as to the sentence 
in this case, there are no guarantees of what the sentence 
might be, except that the maximum sentence can be imposed? Do 
you understand that? 
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir. I do. 
THE COURT: Is there a contemplation by Counsel that 
this case be referred to Adult Probation for a pre-sentence 
report? 
MR. MORGAN: I think that would be appropriate. In 
the interim, I'm going to use my offices in the Third District 
Court to see how mental health Court sentencing will best fit 
with this case; and I'm going to strongly recommend that as 
part of sentencing. 
THE COURT: Okay, see what — we'll see what all the 
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1 Courts do for us. Has he signed the statement, Mr. Stewart? 
2 MR. STEWART: He has not yet. , 
3 THE COURT: Why don't you have him sign it. I find 
4 that Mr. Young knows and understands the Constitutional Rights 
5 that are set forth in the document. He's gone over that 
6 document with his attorney. He's had an opportunity to ask 
7 questions and concerns. He now has nothing additional that he 
8 needs to talk with his lawyer about concerning the information 
9 in that statement. 
10 MR. YOUNG: Uh-huh. 
11 THE COURT: He understands — Mr. Young understands 
12 that there are no guarantees of what the sentence might be, 
13 except that the Court may impose the maximum sentence in this 
14 case, which is zero to five years in the Utah State Prison. 
15 It's the intention of Mr. Young to enter a plea of 
16 guilty of charge in Count I, because he's in fact guilty of 
17 that offense. He's signed the statement, and I accept his 
18 waiver as freely, voluntarily and knowingly given. I'll sign 
19 I off on it now. Accept it. 
20 Okay, Mr. Young, to the charge of the third-degree 
21 felony, influencing, pending, or retaliating against a Judge or 
22 a member of the Board of Pardons, a third-degree felony, what's 
23 you plea to that charge? 
24 MR. YOUNG: Guilty. 
25 THE COURT: A guilty plea is entered. The second count 
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1 is dismissed. I'll refer it to the Adult Probation and Parole 
2 for a pre-sentence Court. Any information that Counsel desires 
3 me to consider at the time of sentencing, which will be on 
4 July the 26th at 10 a.m., should be submitted either before, 
5 so he can consider it; or we'll be resuming at the time of 
6 — or sentenced 7/26, exchange it before, and I'll look at 
7 anything you have. 
8 MR. MORGAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
9 MR. STEWART: Your Honor, is he to remain at the Utah 
10 County Jail, then? 
11 THE COURT: Yes, sir. Okay. 
12 MR. MORGAN: With leave to change that, if that should 
13 become necessary before sentencing? 
14 THE COURT: You may. I guess there's an agreement to 
15 do that, if necessary, right? 
16 MR. STEWART: Right. 
17 THE COURT: That's agreeable. If there is a need to 
18 change his current status from the Utah County Jail to Salt 
19 Lake County Jail, that may be done. 
20 MR. MORGAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
21 MR. STEWART: Thank you. 
22 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
23 (Hearing concluded) 
